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Collecting Child Support: A History of
Federal and State Initiatives
By Naomi R. Cahn andJane  C. Murphy
In this article we sketch an overview of
the increasing federal involvement in the
child-support area. Because the federal
role has grown so dramatically over the
past 25 years, family law practitioners
need to understand the different federal
programs and requirements that affect
state management of child-support pre
grams. While for many low-income par-
ents state agencies handle child-support
establishment and collection, the feder-
alization of child support has practical
implications when it comes to both estab-
lishing and enforcing child support. For
example, as the time limits of the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act begin to have
their effects, child support may become
a supplement more and more needed by
custodial parents.’
We begin this article with a brief his-
tory of the changing nature of federal
involvement in child support-focusing
on the origins of the federally mandated
state child-support departments (“IV-D”
agencies)-and then examine the devel-
opment of mandatory child-support guide-
lines. We conclude with a listing of the
implications of the federalization of child
support for the family law practitioner.
I. Background to Federalization
Although the federal government had
become involved in child-support pro-
grams much earlier, the Social Services
Amendments of 1974 signaled the begin-
ning of the contemporary federal-state
partnership approach to child ~upport.~
Through this legislation, Congress man-
dated the creation of the federal Office of
Child Support Enforcement and required
that states participate in various programs
of that ofice to increase the effectiveness
of child-support collections. Congress
adopted the Social Services Amendments
of 1974 in an effort to remedy a steadily
increasing number of female-headed
households living in poverty, which it
blamed on the rising number of absent
fathers.3 Senate Finance Committee
reports cited studies reporting that from
1959 to 1968, while the poverty rate “for
male-headed families went down to 7 per-
cent, poverty among female-headed fam-
ilies increased to 32 percent,” rising even
further to 36 percent by 1970.4
’ See Paula Roberts, l%e Potentiu[ for Child Support as an Income Source for Low-Income
Families,  31 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.  565 (Mar.-Apr. 1998).
*Social  Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975) (codified
at 42 U.S.C.  Q 1305).
3 S. REP. No. 93-1356,  at 43-44 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 814648.
*Id. at 8147-48.
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Before the 1974 amendments, Con-
gress had attempted to deal with child
abandonment and lax child-support en-
forcement through the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program.5 In
1950 Congress established procedures to
give law enforcement officials notice that
a child was receiving aid because the
child had been deserted, abandoned, or
both, creating for the first time a rela-
tionship between actually receiving assis-
tance and enforcing support obligations6
In 1967 Congress enacted legislation man-
dating that each state welfare agency
“establish a single, identified unit whose
purpose is to undertake to establish the
paternity of each child receiving welfare
9 . and to secure help for him.“’ In spite
of these steps forward, a 1972 General
Accounting Office study showed that the
Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare had failed to monitor state child-
support enforcement practices appropri-
ately and consequently had no knowl-
edge of the degree to which states were
satisfying federal requirements8
Moreover, before the adoption of
child-support guidelines in the late 198Os,
judges relied on broad discretionary stan-
dards to decide how much a noncustodi-
al parent must pay in child support.9
These vague standards were applied in
any case in which child support was estab-
lished, including in divorce, separation, or
paternity proceedings in which initial sup-
port was set, or in modification proceed-
ings. Traditionally most states’ statutes sim-
ply instructed the court that parents had an
obligation to support their chi1d.l”  Case
law interpreting these statutory provisions
required courts, when setting the amount
of support, to consider the needs of the
child and the noncustodial spouse’s abil-
ity to pay. I1 Both the preguideline Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act and the
Uniform Parentage Act relied on a series
of factors to determine the appropriate
amount of child supp~rt.~~  However, an
utter lack of uniformity not only between
states but also within states characterized
the setting of the level of child support.
II. Federalization
Against the background of these failed
efforts, Congress enacted the Social Ser-
vices Amendments of 1974. Since then,
the federal government has become in-
creasingly involved in state child-support
efforts and now requires child-support
guidelines, wage withholding, the regis-
tering of new hires, and other methods to
improve child-support collection. The first
step toward improving collection was the
creation of better coordination between
166
‘When Aid to Families with Dependent Children was enacted in the 193Os,  a father’s
death was the primary basis for a family’s eligibility. With the advent of social security
survivor benefits, this basis of eligibility decreased from 43 percent in 1940 to 4 percent
in 1973. Id. at 8146. Also, the number of families receiving aid because the father was
disabled decreased from 18.1 percent in 1961 to 10.2 percent in 1973. Id. Aid benefits to
families with absent fathers, however, increased from 66.7 percent in 1961 to 80.2 per-
cent in 1973. Id.
6Zd. at 8148.
7 Id. at 9148.
*Id. at 8148-49.
90n  child-support guidelines adopted in the late 198Os, see Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 8 103, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667
(1988)). See also 45 C.F.R. $5 301.10 (stating that an approved state plan is a condition
for federal financial assistance), 302.56(a) (requiring that state plans contain child-sup-
port guidelines) (1990).
“See,  e.g., ARIZ.  REV. STAT. ANN. $ 12-2451 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 0 501
(1981); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 8 5-203 (1984).
l1 See, e.g., Beck v. Jaeger, 604 P.2d 18, 19 (Ariz. 1979); Pencovic v. Pencovic, 287 P.2d 501
(Cal. 1955); Unkle v. Unkle, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (Md. App. 1986); Earle v. Earle, 130
N.Y.S.Zd 238 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1954); Halt v. Holt, 223 S.E.2d  542 (N.C. App. 1976). See also
LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 0 1.01, at l-3
(Supp.  1997) (describing two factors under preguideline discretionary standard for setting
child support as “ability of the obligor parent to pay and the needs of the child”).
‘* UNIF. -GE AND DIVORCE  Acr 0 109, 9A U.L.A. 400 (1987); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr 515,
9B U.L.A. 454 (1973).
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state and federal collection efforts; the
second, a requirement of more uniform
standards for establishing child support.
A. 1974: Family Support Act, Title
IV-D of Social Security Act
In addition to enacting the Social
Services Amendments, in 1974, Congress
enacted the Family Support Act, title IV-
D of the Social Security Act.13 Title IV-D
required state participation in programs-
including parent location, paternity estab-
lishment, and child-support order enforce-
ment-of the newly established Office of
Child Support Enforcement.l*  The legis-
lation aimed to increase federal oversight
over state child-support collections, with
a focus on families on public welfare. Like
subsequent legislation, it established both
federal and state obligations.
1. Federal Obligations
The Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment was created as a separate unit, with
the director reporting directly to the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.lS  Under title
IV-D the office was required to (1) estab-
lish standards for state child-support pro-
grams; (2) establish minimum organiza-
tional and staffing requirements for state
agencies; (3) review and approve state
programs; (4) evaluate the implementa-
tion of state programs; (5) assist states in
establishing reporting or records proce-
dures, including technical assistance; (6)
receive applications from states and grant
permission to use federal courts to en-
force court orders against out-of-state par-
ents; and (7) operate the “Parent Locator
Service” as a clearinghouse for data and
Collecting Child Suppoll
information for locating absent parents
to enforce their outstanding support
obligations. I6 Although states retained
fundamental authority to implement their
child-support programs, title IV-D dele-
gated to the federal government a more
active oversight power.”
2. State Obligations
Under title IV-D a state plan for child
support is required to satisfy certain min-
imum standards in order to avoid feder-
al funding sanctions.18 Pursuant to title
IV-D a state agency must (1) create a sin-
gle and separate organizational unit (not
necessarily administered by the welfare
agency), meeting staffing and organita-
tional requirements as prescribed by the
Health and Human Services Secretary; (2)
undertake to establish the paternity of eli-
gible children; (3) ensure interstate coop-
eration in child-support efforts; (4) spec-
ify ways to distribute proceedings,
including a plan to make collection ser-
vices available to noneligible children
through an application process; (5) pro-
vide for cooperative arrangements with
appropriate courts and law enforcement
officials to assist in enforcing support
orders; and (6) set up a parent locator
service using all sources of information
and available records in establishing
paternity, locating an absent parent, and
securing compliance.19
As a result of title IV-D,  recipients of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
were required to assign their child and
spousal support rights to the state, a re-
quirement which has continued through-
out all of the changes in welfare law.*O
Such recipients who also cooperated with
l3 Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.  68 651-70 (1994)).
l4 See Robyn  Shields, Comment, Can the Feds Put Deadbeat Parents in Jail?: A Look At the
Constitutionality of the Child Suppot?  Recovery Act, 60 ALB. L. RN. 1409, 1412 (1997).
l5 See Pub. L. No. 93-647, 8 452(a), 88 Stat. 2337 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 652 (1994)).
l6 42 U.S.C. $5 652(a), 653 (as amended).
“See S. F&P. No. 93-1356, at 4647 (1974),  reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8150. In
effect Congress intended to transform the existing federal “perfunctory review” of state
plans into a more rigorous annual examination of state child-support programs. Id. at
8151.
‘*See  Paula Roberts, Child Support Enforcement: An Zntroduction,  25 CLEARINGHOUSE RN.
868,869 (Nov. 1991); see a&o 42 U.S.C. 0 654.
l9 42 U.S.C. 8 654.
2o See rd. 5 656(a)(l);  see aLFo Roberts, supra note 18, at 868-69.
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the state in collection efforts and paterni-
ty establishment were automatically re-
ferred for IV-D services at no additional
cost.*l Nonrecipient families might also
use IV-D services but had to apply for eli-
gibility and pay an application fee.**
Under title IV-D states were required
to pass through some of the money col-
lected to the family.23  Any amount col-
lected beyond the payment to the family
was retained by the state as reimbursement
for welfare payments.** Although states
A s a result of title W-D, recipients ofAid
to Families with Dependent Ck?dren were
required to assign their child and spousal
support rights to the state, a requirement which
has continued throughout all of the changes in
welfare law.
are no longer required to pass through
amounts as a result of the 1996 welfare
reform bill, they are permitted  to do SO.*~
Title IV-D initiated a nationwide
growth in child-support enforcement pre
grams. In 1983 alone $2 billion in pay-
ments, four times the amount in 1976,
were collected, and 800,000 parents were
located, an increase over the 181,500
located in 1976.26
B. 1984: Child Support Enforcement
Amendments
In 1984 Congress enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments to
strengthen IV-D agencies both jurisdic-
tionally and procedurally and to increase
the effectiveness of the programs, ensur-
ing their availability to both recipients
and nonrecipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children.*’  The amendments
imposed a number of requirements on
all IV-D agencies. ** The amendments
mandated that the agencies (1) imple-
ment mandatory wage withholding after
one month of overdue support without
changing the court order but with ad-
vance notice to absent parents and their
employers; (2) provide for liens against
personal and real property for amounts of
overdue child support by a resident of
the state where the property is located;
(3) withhold income tax refunds to non-
custodial parents who owe overdue pay-
ments; (4) permit paternity establishment
at any time before a child’s 18th birthday
(extending the statute of limitations on
support claims); (5) expedite processes
within a state judicial system for estab-
lishing paternity and enforcing and ob-
taining child-support orders; (6) notify
recipients of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children at east once each year
of the amount of child support collected
on their behalf; and (7) allow broader
use of the Federal Parent Locator Service
(states no longer have to exhaust all state
resources before requesting federal assis-
tance).29 The amendments also required
states to enact nonbinding guidelines for
support awards to be used by judges and
other administrators.30
21
22
See Roberts, supra note 18, at 869.
See 42 U.S.C. Q 654(6)(B).
23Seeid.  657.Q
24 See id.
2s See Roberts, supra note 1, at 572-73.
26See S. REP. No. at 119 8 - 3 8 7 ,  (1984), reprinted 1984 2397,in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2407.
27 See id at 2397; Roberts, strpra note 18, at 871. These amendments “effectively national-
ized” child-support establishment and collection. Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and
ChildSsuppott,  5 VA. J. Sot. POL’Y  & L. 541, 546 (1998).
‘sSee  Child Support Enforcement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-378, $ 466, 98 Stat. 130&8
(1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $1 666-67).
29Zd.;  see S. REP. No. 98-387,  at 29, 30, 53 (1984), in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.reprinted 2397,
2425-26,2471.
3042  U.S.C. 667. “The0 guidelines . binding judgesneed not be such orupon other
officials.” Id.; see Shields, supra note 14, at 1412..
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C. 1988: Family Support Act
Four years later Congress again con-
fronted problems in the enforcement sys-
tem, especially with respect to inconsis-
tent orders.sl  The Family Support Act
made existing provisions more stringent
and imposed mandatory requirements on
IV-D agencies in order to continue receiv-
ing federal funding.32
The Act also changed the method of
establishing child-support levels. The
inadequacy of most states’ discretionary
standards in setting the amount of child
support took on crisis proportions by the
early 1980s.  Insufficient child support had
become a major cause of the spiraling
poverty rate among women and chil-
dren.33 Of the 9.4 million custodial par-
ents in 1987, 41 percent had no child-
support award.3* When courts did award
child support, award levels usually were
inadequate, thrusting many children and
custodial parents into poverty or a seri-
ously diminished standard of living.35 In
1979 the average awards comprised only
37 percent of the estimated average
monthly expenditure for children in a
middle-income household and only 55
percent in a low-income household.36
Over time the poor record of collecting
child support combined with the inade-
quate level of awards resulted in a sub-
stantial loss of child support for custodi-
al households.37
In addition to the inadequacy of the
award itself, the traditional system of vir-
tually unlimited judicial discretion in this
area led to “pronounced disparities in
awards from court to court, from judge to
judge, and from case to case.“38  Although
some of the disparity may have been
attributable to such factors as differences
in income of noncustodial parents, the
existence of an alimony award, and the
type of custody awarded, substantial arbi-
trary differences existed. In one study
from the mid-1980s  a random sampling of
cases revealed that fathers earning $155
per week had to pay anywhere from $10
to $60 per week for one child, depend-
ing on the judge.39
The Family Support Act made sup-
port award guidelines binding in any
“judicial or administrative proceeding.“40
Courts were supposed to treat guidelines
as rebuttable presumptions and disregard
them only upon a specific showing that
the guidelines would be unjust and inap-
propriate in a particular case.*l  The Act
further required states to enact laws pro-
31 See S. REP. No. 100-377,  at l-2 (19881,  reprinted  in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2777, 2778.
32See  id. at 2778; Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at
42 U.S.C. $8 666-67.
33B~~~~~  OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL  STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 167, at 2-4 (1990) [here-
inafter CENSUS  BUREAU].
34Zd.  at 1.
35 Lucy Yee, What Really Happens in Child Suppoti  Cases: An Empirical Study of
Establishment and Enforcement of Child Suppolt  Orders  in the Denver District Court, 57
DEIW.  U. L. REV.  21, 50 (1979).
36 Karen Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What  It Has Meant Anuncially  to Women tn
California, FAM. ADVOC.,  Spring 1979, at 10, 1+15 (estimating that child-support awards
are less than half the actual costs of raising a child).
37 In 1987 only one-half of the women with child-support orders received the full amount.
Almost onequarter received partial payments while the other onequarter received noth-
ing. CENSUS BUEAIJ, silpra note 33, at 4.
38 Sally F. Goldfarb, What Evey Lawyer Should Know About Child Suppolt  Guidelines, 13
FAM. L. REP. 3031, 3032 (1987).
39J~~~~~  I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 12 (1986); see Yee, supra  note 35, at 28,
52-53. But see MARYGOLD S. MELLI, CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS: A STUDY OF THE EXRCISE OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 41-42 (Inst. for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper 734-83, 1983)
(finding that variations in the approximately 148 child-support orders from the four
judges studied was more a function of the differences in income of the parties than of
the differences in criteria applied by the judges).
4042  U.S.C. 06 66&667.
41 See id. 0 667(b)(2).
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viding for immediate wage withholding,
regardless of whether the payments were
in arrears, unless a party could demon-
strate good cause for a statutory de-
viance.42  States were required to develop
better information processing.43  The Act
also created performance standards for
state paternity establishment programs4
D. 1992: Child Support Recovery Act
To remedy inefficient and inconsis-
tent enforcement from state to state,
Congress enacted the Child Support Re-
covery Act of 1992, which created a new
federal crime for willful failure to make
past-due support payments to a child
residing in another state.*5 The elements
of the interstate crime are willful failure
to pay child support (1) that is due to a
child residing in a different state from the
obligor and (2) that is due in an amount
greater than $5,000 or has remained
unpaid longer than one year.& The par-
ent’s first offense results in a fine or
imprisonment for not more than six
months or both.*7 Any subsequent of-
fenses result in a fine or imprisonment
for up to two years or both.‘@ A court
would order restitution of all past-due
support in addition to a fine or impris-
onment.49  Moreover, the Act gave feder-
al judges discretion to require full pay-
e d  t h e  E m p l o y e e  R e t i r e m e n t  I n c o m e
Security Act of 1974 to establish Qualified
Medical Child Support Orders.Sl In effect
Congress mandated that employers with
employees who were child-support oblig-
ors extend health plan coverage to the
obligor’s children.5*
E 1996: Welfare  Reform Law
In 1996 Congress enacted the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act.53  This law
affects not only public welfare but also
nearly every aspect of child-support ser-
vices with respect to both obligations of
IV-D agencies and the duties of the recip-
ients themselves.
1. Federal Obligations
The Act expands the Federal Parent
Locator Service, permitting parties to use
the service not only to enforce child-sup-
ment of child-support obligations as a
condition of probations0
E. 1993: Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act
To reduce the large Medicaid pay-
ments to children denied coverage under
their noncustodial parent’s insurance,
Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, which amend-
170
42 See id. 0 666.
43See rd. !jO 503, 667.
44
See td. 0 666; see ako Roberts, supra note 18, at 873 (stating that all parties of contested
actions must submit to genetic testing).
45Child Support Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 228(a), 106 Stat. 3403 (1992)  (codi-
46
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. 0 228).
See id. 0 228(d)(l)(B). For a general discussion of the Child Support Recovery Act, see
Shields, supm note 14.
47See  18 U.S.C. &?  228(b).
%%id.
49 See fd.  Q 228(c).
%ee fd. 0 3563(b).
51 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 5 1169 (1994); Pub. L. No.
103-66, 8 4301(a), 107 Stat. 312, 372 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. $3 1021, 1144, 1169);
see Linda D. Elrod, Child Suppot? Reassessed: Federalization of Enforcement Nears
Completion, 197 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 702 (Congress was trying to combat the denial of
coverage to children because of “restrictive dependency definitions and [Employee
Retirement Income Security Act] preemption”).
‘l&e 29 U.S.C. 0 1169(a)(2XBXi). The legislation required states to enact laws that would
apply to all health plans, regardless of the number of employees. Elrod, supra note 51,
at 702.
53Personal  Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996)  (codifed  as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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port orders but also to establish parent-
age, modify child-support orders, and
enforce custody or visitation orders.54 The
Act also broadens the information made
available through the service to include
records concerning wages, employee
benefits, and type, status, location, and
amount of assets.55
To facilitate locating individuals to
establish paternity or to modify or enforce
a support order, the Act mandates that
all employers must report information on
new hires within 20 days to a state direc-
tory. The National Directory of New Hires
is an automated directory of records from
the state directories.56  The Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services must compare data col-
lected in the directory with information in
the Federal Case Registry at least every
two business days and report any match-
es.57 The registry is an automated record
system containing support orders and
case information.58
2. State Obligations
The Act imposes several obligations
on state agencies in addition to expand-
ing the Federal Parent Locator Service
and facilitating the establishment of pater-
nity. The Act requires structural and pro-
grammatic changes, promotes the adop-
tion of uniform state laws, and modifies
requirements for program eligibility and
disbursement of support payments.
The Act expands eligibility for ser-
vices and increases state IV-D agency
obligations to provide a wider range of
Collecting Child Stippt
child-support enforcement services.59
State agencies must now provide for the
establishment, modification, and enforce-
ment of support orders to an increased
range of children, including those receiv-
ing benefits from the Temporary Assist-
ance for Needy Families block grant and
foster care payments.@
The Act also mandates significant
changes in the case tracking and parent
locator systems in each state. Each state
must establish an automated state case reg-
istry, containing a record of each case in
which a state agency is providing ser-
vice~.~*  The Act encourages states to com-
pile these registries by “linking local case
records through an automated information
network” and using “standankzed  data ele-
ments” to make available names, dates of
birth, and identification numbers6* The
state agency is also responsible for updat-
ing and monitoring the records63
The Act further requires that state
agencies enact specific procedures to
expedite the establishment of paternity
and enforcement of support orders, alle-
viating the need for additional judicial or
administrative proceedings to obtain per-
mission for modihcation.64 State agencies
must have the authority to (1) order
genetic testing; (2) subpoena financial
information to enforce a support order;
(3) require all state entities to give infor-
mation about employment, compensa-
tion, and benefits of any individual
employed by that entity; (4) access state
records including corrections records and
vital statistics, tax, and revenue informa-
54 See 5 316(c)a, 110 Stat. at 2214-15 (to be codified at 42 USC. 9 653). For general infor-
mation about the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Opportunity Act, see
Paula Roberts, The Family Law Implications of the 1996 Welfare Legfslatton, 30
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 988 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
“See 5 316(c)a, 110 Stat. at 2214-15 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 653).
% See 5 453A(g)(2), 110 Stat. at 2211 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 653(i)).
“See 8 3160X2)(~),  110 Stat. at 2217 (to be codified at 42 USC. 8 653(j)).
“See 5 316(hXl), 110 Stat. at 2216.
s9See 5 301, 110 Stat. at 2199 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 654).
@See H.R. CONF.  REP. NO. 104-725,  at 33 (1996) *tinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2726.
” See 5 311(e)(l), 110 Stat. at 2205 (to be codified at 42 U.K.  3 454A(e)).
62 See id.
63 See id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 4 454A(eX5)).
&See 42 U.S.C. $ 666(c); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, (1996), reprinted fn 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2741.
JULY-AUGUST 2000 1 JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND POLICY 171
Colkctfng  Child Support
tion; (5) order income withholding or
secure assets; (6) increase the amount of
support payments to include arrearages;
and (7) authorize statewide jurisdiction
over child-support and paternity cases.65
To facilitate paternity establishment,
the Act requires states to permit paterni-
ty establishment at any time before a child
is 18 years of age and to mandate genet-
ic testing in a contested paternity case at
the request of one party.@j States must
create a simple civil process for voluntary
paternity acknowledgment, including pro-
cedures enacting a hospital-based pro-
gram, and also safeguard the due process
rights of the mother and putative father
with respect to awareness of the legal
consequences of and the alternatives to
voluntary paternity acknowledgment.67
Another notable aspect of the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act is its effort
to promote the adoption of uniform state
laws.@ For instance, it required that all
states adopt the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act by January 1, 1998.69  More-
over, in amending the Full Faith and
Credit Act, the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
clarifies choice of law and jurisdictional
dilemmas which may arise.‘O  First, if only
one court issues a support order, that
order must be recognized.” But if two
or more courts issue orders, and only one
court maintains exclusive jurisdiction, the
order of the exclusive-jurisdiction court
should take precedence.‘*  If two or more
courts issue orders and more than one
claims exclusive jurisdiction, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act gives precedence to
the court located in the child’s current
state of residence.‘3  If the courts of the
child’s resident state do not issue any
orders, the parties adhere to the order
most recently issued from any co~rt.~*
States must respond within five business
days to one another’s requests to enforce
orders’s
State IV-D agencies are also required
by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act to oper-
ate a centralized system to collect and
distribute child-support payments for
orders issued after December 31, 1993.‘”
The agency must use automated proce-
dures to (1) receive payments for dis-
bursement to custodial parents; (2) iden-
tify payments accurately; (3) ensure
prompt disbursement; and (4) furnish
timely information about the current sta-
tus of support payments upon request.”
The Act prescribes that the state distrib-
ute support payments to families within
two business days of their receipt.78 At a
minimum, IV-D agencies must utilize dis-
bursement units to transmit orders to
employers for income withholding, mon-
itor and identify any failures to make
timely payments, and automatically use
enforcement procedures if the timely pay-
ments are not made.‘9
6s42 U.S.C. 0 666(c).
ZZd. 8 666(a)(5).
See id. The father’s name is included on the birth certificate of a child of unmarried par-
ents only if both the mother and father sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or
68 a court or agency issues a paternity adjudication. Id. 0 666(a)(5)(D).
See 8 321, 110 Stat. at 2221 (amending 42 U.S.C.69 Q 666(O).
See id.
“See 5 110 Stat. at 2221322, (amending 42 U.S.C. 0 1738B(f))
” See 42 U.S.C. 8 1738B(D(l).
72 See id. 5 1738B(f)(2).
73 See id. 3 1738B(fX3).
74 See id.
” See id. 0 666(aX14).
76 See id. 8 654b(a).
n see id. 9 654HaXNb).
‘* See id. 8 654b(aX3Xc).
79 See id. 8 654b(a).
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The Act modifies distribution of
child-support collections to welfare recip
ients so that the first $50 received no
longer goes straight to a family.80 Col-
lections on arrearages which accumulate
after the family leaves the welfare system
are paid to the state if collected through
“tax intercept. J181 Also, any arrearages
accumulated before the family went on
welfare are paid to the state if they are
procured through tax seizure; otherwise,
those funds go to the family.82 Using
these new procedures, Congress intend-
ed to “provide more money to families
that leave welfare and thereby increase
the odds that such families will be able to
maintain their independence from public
benefits. “83
III. Implications for Practitioners
The major effects of the “federalization”
of child support for practitioners concern
the shift from discretionary child-support
standards to the use of guidelines to
establish and modify the amount of sup-
port, the development of mandatory
wage withholding, and the strengthening
of interstate enforcement.
A. From Discretionary Standards to
Guidelines
The preguideline statutory and case
law on how to set child support has lit-
tle relevance in disputes regarding the
appropriate amount of child support
today. The Family Support Act did, how-
ever, preserve limited judicial discretion.
Decision makers hearing child-support
cases can rebut the presumption that the
guideline level of support is appropriate
by a specific finding that application of
the guidelines would be unjust or inap
propriate in a particular case, as deter-
Collecting Child Suppott
mined under criteria established by each
state.84 Cases from the discretionary era
therefore may be of some value in rebut-
ting the presumption in favor of the
guidelines in particular circumstances.
For example, the application of guide-
lines under many “income shares” for-
mulae results in a higher percentage of
income devoted to child support for low-
income obligors than for middle- and
high-income obligors.85 The percentage
of income presumed to go toward child
support under many of these formulae
goes down as the income of the obligor
increases. Both judges and commenta-
tors have expressed concern that such
formulae combined with stricter enforce-
ment of child support may have harmful
effects on low-income obligors and drive
80See id. 5 657; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-651, at 1398-99  (1996),  reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2457-58.
81See 42 USC.  5 657; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 339 (19961,  reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2727.
82 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 340 (1996),  reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2728.
83H.R.  REP. No. 104-651, at 1399 (1996),  rvprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2458.
84 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2).
85 For a complete list of states that have adopted the “income shares” model, see Laura W.
Morgan & Mark C. Line, A Comparison of Child Suppott  Awards Calculated Under States’
Chtld Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 191 (1999).
JULY-AUGUST 2000 1 JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND POLICY 173
Collecting Child Support
174
them “underground.“86  Attorneys repre-
senting low-income obligors then might
persuade the tribunal to deviate from the
guidelines and order less than the pre-
sumed amount by relying on arguments
from preguideline case law emphasizing
that child support should not be ordered
at a level which makes it difficult for the
obligor to support himseIf.87
Some courts, particularly where the
parents are unmarried and the obligor
and child have not lived together, seem
to set a maximum amount of child sup-
port regardless of parental income.88 In
others, where the parents and child or
children have lived together as a family,
courts have held that support should be
awarded at a level which permits the chil-
dren to maintain the predivorce standard
of living.89 Apart from these limited cir-
cumstances, practitioners should consid-
er  the preguideline body of case law
inapplicable in cases in which issues arise
as to the amount of support.
B. Mandatory Wage Withholding
Income or wage garnishment has long
been available to the practitioner as a
method of collecting unpaid child sup-
ports0 Before 1984, use of this enforce-
ment remedy was governed almost exclu-
sively by state law. Early wage withholding
statutes s imply required employers to
honor voluntary wage assignments.
In 1974 only 10 states had statutory
versions of child-support wage assign-
ments.91  By 1984 26 states began sys-
tematic  withholding-based on a  court
order after the finding of a delinquen-
cy -o f  i ncome  f rom an  ob l igo r ’ s  pay-
check.92  These state statutes and cases
ranged widely on issues such as pregar-
nishment procedural protections for the
obligor, triggers for income withholding,
and limits on the percentage of an oblig-
or’s wages which could be withheld.93
Limits on withholding were made some-
what uniform by the passage of the fed-
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act in
86
See JOHN F. FADER II & RICHARD J. GILBERT, ~WWLAND  FAMILY LAW $ 13.91 (1992 Cumul.
Supp.)  (two judges who authored treatise express “concern” that Maryland “income
shares” formulae will result in orders in which low- to moderate-income payors will not
be able to support themselves and meet their child-support obligation); see also Harry D.
Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in
87
DNORCE  REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166 (Stephen Sugannan & Herman Hill Ray eels., 1990).
See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Money Awarded as
88
Childsupport,  27 A.L.R.4th  873, 887-89 (1984).
See White v. Marciano, 235 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1987) (finding that $1,500 per month was a
reasonable amount of support for child born outside of marriage to father with income
of $1 million per year and that father’s lavish lifestyle was relevant only if father was
unable to make “adequate support payments”); Evans v. Evans, 559 N.W.Zd 240 (SD.
1997) (Clearinghouse No. 48,074) (where the parties’ income exceeds the statutory
guidelines, the child-support obligation shall be established at an appropriate level, tak-
ing into account the actual needs and standard of living of the child).
89See  In w Scafuri, 561 N.E.2d  402 (Ill. 1990) (where children’s needs and accustomed
lifestyle could be maintained on an award of $6,000  per month, trial court’s order of
$10,000 per month was an abuse of discretion even though it complied with the guide-
lines).
%HARRY  D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAI. PERSPECTIVE  34549 (1981).  Some
states allowed the assignment of the father’s wages when the support decree was
entered. See, e.g., CAL. Crv.  CODE $ 4701(a) (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. 0 61.12(2)
(West Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. $ 767.265 (West Supp. 1983). Others required default
in the payment of support before allowing an assignment of the obligor’s wages. See,
e.g., ARK REV.  STAT. ANN. 6 12-2455 (West 1982); MICH.  COMP. LAWS  ANN. $ 552.605 (West
Supp. 19831; MINN. STAT. ANN. 8 518.611 (West Supp. 1984).
” Note, Remedies-Domestic Relations: Garnishmentfor  Child Support, 56 N.C. L. REV. 169,
177-78 n.57 (1978).
92U.S.  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1984 CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT AMENDMENT 9 (Dec. 1985).
93 On pregamishment procedural protections for the obligor, see Lany  v. Superior Court 200
Cal. Rptr. 526 (1984) (pregamishment hearing required); Hehr v. Tucker, 472 P.2d 797’(Or.
1970)  (no pregamishment hearing required). Most states used a delinquent dollar amount
as a trigger  for income withholding, but some used a time delay in paying support.
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V&3.9* That Act placed a maximum limit
on the amount states might withhold for
child support but did not set a minimum.
Limits on percentage of income which
may be withheld still vary.
T h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  w i t h h o l d i n g
under state law was limited for a number
of reasons. AS with decisions governing
the amount of child support, the decision
to order  wage withholding was within
the court’s discretion.95  Proceedings for
wage withholding were judicial  rather
than administrative and, for lack of fixed
rules, were often adversarial. Most states
permitted wage garnishment only after
chi ld-support  arrearages had accrued.
Custodial parents had to return to court
to obtain a new withholding order each
time arrears accumulated. Thus practi-
tioners would counsel clients with child-
support orders to wait until substantial
back child support had accumulated be-
fore incurring the expense of obtaining a
wage garnishment order.
Federal legislation has improved the
effectiveness of this remedy. While state
wage withholding statutes still vary, a
series of federal statutes mandates fea-
tures which all states must adopt. To-
gether these features have created a leg-
is lat ive scheme which is  designed to
make wage withholding a regular item
of every child-support order from the
date of issuance until the termination of
the order.
Pursuant to the Child Support En-
forcement Amendments, all states were
required to enact procedures for wage
withholding to collect child support in all
cases where the obligor had fallen into
arrears.96 “Wage” withholding became
“income” withholding under this statute
b e c a u s e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  a u t h o r i z e d
states to expand the definition of “wages”
to include forms of income other than
those normally included in the defini-
tion.9’ Pennsylvania, for example, defines
“income” as compensation for services,
i nc lud ing  bu t  no t  l im i t ed  t o  wages ,
salaries, fees, compensation in kind, com-
mis s ions  and  s imi l a r  i t ems ,  i ncome
derived from business, gains derived from
dealings in property, forms of retirement,
pensions, i n c o m e  f r o m  d i s c h a r g e  o f
indebtedness, distributive share of part-
nership gross income, income with re-
spect  to  a  decedent ,  income from an
interest in an estate or trust, military retire-
m e n t  b e n e f i t s ,  r a i l r o a d  e m p l o y m e n t
retirement benefits, social security bene-
fits, temporary and permanent disability
benefits, workmen’s compensation, and
94 Initially the Consumer Credit Protection Act allowed wage garnishments of up to 25 per-
cent of a wage-earner’s disposable income or 30 times the federal minimum hourly
wage, whichever was the lesser amount. 15 U.S.C. $ 1673(a).  In 1977 Congress amended
the Act to raise withholding ceilings of child support or alimony orders to (1) 50 percent
of the employee’s weekly disposable earnings if obligor supports a second family; (2) 55
percent if obligor supports a second family and arrears are I2 weeks past due; (3) 60
percent if he or she does not support a second family; or (4) 65 percent if the employee
does not support a second family and the action is to enforce a support order for a peri-
od commencing more than 12 weeks before the workweek from which the wages will
be garnished ( i.e., arrears are 12 weeks past due). The Act preempts less restrictive state
laws, so limitations apply even if a state does not incorporate the Act’s limitations into
its withholding statute. 15 USC. 1677;  Marshall v. District Court, 444 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.
Mich.  1981).  States are, however, free to enact statutes that provide greater protection of
95
obligors’ income. 15 U.S.C. 8 1677.
See, e.g., Nan Hunter, Child Support  Luw and Policy: 7’be  Systemic Imposition of Costs on
Women, 6 HAN. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1983).
% 42 U.S.C. 0 659. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 made a distinc-
tion between private cases and allowed states to develop procedures for withholding
when a private order was involved. Later statutes have eliminated the different treatment
for IV-D and non-IV-D orders.
97 42 U.S.C. 8 666(b)(8). Most states define income more broadly under the Child Support
Enforcement Amendments for withholding purposes than the Consumer Credit
Protection Act’s definition of “disposable earnings” subject to withholding. In child-sup-
port withholding cases, the state’s definition of income subject to withholding governs
as long as it is broader than the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s definition.
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unemployment compensation.98  Other
state statutes have been interpreted to
include as income “commissions” due or
advanced to the obligor, disabled veter-
an’s benefits, lottery winnings, and mili-
tary retirement pay.99 Under the amend-
ments, wages could be withheld to cover
current support as well as arrears up to
the limits set by the Consumer Credit
Protection Act. loo The amendments’ sec-
tion that restricts the amount of wages a
Wbile state wage withholding statutes still vary,
a series offederal  statutes mandates features
which allstates  must adopt.
state may withhold to no more than the
limits of the consumer credit act does not
apply to nonwage  income.101
The amendments also required that
states have a procedure for terminating
arrearages.lo2 States were free to establish
their own procedures but were not
allowed to make payment of arrears the
sole criteria for termination of wage with-
holding. lo3 As a result, some states have
discretionary standards for termination of
withholding, permitting the obligor to
argue that such termination would be
equitable. lo4 Others have more specific
criteria, including inability to deliver pay-
ments to obligee and emancipation of
childrenlo Employers may face sanc-
tions for terminating withholding before
the enforcement agency notifies the
employer to stop. Such notification would
presumably follow an application by the
obligor and a court order.
For practitioners, January 1, 1994,
marked the major change in availability
of immediate wage withholding. As of
that date, all new child-support orders,
including non-IV-D cases, had to provide
for immediate income withholding. Wage
withholding was not to be ordered if
good cause was shown by the obligor to
exclude such a provision or both parties
agreed to an alternative arrangement.lM
This is an important provision for practi-
tioners representing clients who do not
want to be subject to automatic with-
holding and can obtain the agreement of
the custodial parent to waive this pro-
tection. A good-cause exception or agree-
ment may be set aside, however, and
withholding imposed if an obligor is
delinquent in support in an amount equal
to one months support.
As part of its scheme for reforming
the welfare system, the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act also includes a number of pro-
visions designed to strengthen child-
support enforcement. Since eligibility for
withholding was made more or less uni-
versal by the Family Support Act, the
income withholding provisions in the
Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act focus primarily
9a23  PA. CONS. STAT. AN-N. 5 4302 (West Supp. 1989); see Stinner v. Stinner, 554 A.2d 45
99(Pa.),  cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989).
See Galpen v. Galpen, 535 A.2d 35 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1987) (commissions); Rose v. Rose,
481 U.S. 619 (1987) (disabled veteran’s benefits); County of Contra Costa v. Lemon, 252
Cal. Rptr. 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (lottery winnings); Millard v. U.S., I6 Cl. Ct. 485
(1989) afld,  916 F.2d 1 (1990>,  cert. dented, 500 U.S. 916  (1991) (military retirement
pay). But see County of Kern, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1999) (lottery winnings).
:I See discussion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, srrpra  note 94.
If a state does define wages to include all income, then the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments require that the Consumer Credit Protection Act apply to all income; but if
a state does not combine wage and nonwage  income in its definition of wages, then
nonwage income is not subject to the amendments’ mandatory use of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act’s caps. 42 U.S.C. 0 666(b)(1)  (Supp.  V 1987).
lo245  C.F.R. 8 303.100(a)(9)  (1999).
lo3Zd.
‘04See  Simpson v. Simpson, 680 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
“‘See In re Feiock, 215 Cal. App. 3d 141 (1989) (inability to deliver payments to obligee);
Denton  v. Sims, 884 S.W.2d 86 (MO. Ct. App. 1994) (emancipation of children).
lo642  U.S.C. 3 466 (a)(B)(B)(i).
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on the procedures implementing auto-
matic withholding. lo7 The latter encour-
ages but does not require states to adopt
administrative rather than judicial systems
to enforce child support. States, howev-
er, must have certain “expedited proce-
dures” for handling routine cases, includ-
ing cases in which income withholding is
ordered. These expedited procedures
grant authority to the state IV-D agency
to initiate withholding or to modify any
order that does not have income with-
holding “without the necessity of obtain-
ing an order from any judicial or admin-
istrative tribunal.“lo8  Record keeping of
amounts collected and disbursed through
withholding is to be centralized in a sin-
gle state office rather than several local
offices.lo9  The central state office must
have sufficient staff to monitor and
enforce support obligations through the
centralized unit.llO  The central office is
also supposed to make timely responses
to requests from parents (or, presumably,
their attorneys) about the status of their
cases. Again, for those attorneys repre-
senting clients-both obligors and oblig-
ees-who want to opt out of the auto-
matic withholding system, the exceptions
for good cause and consent waiver of
withholding are preserved in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act.“’ For those attorneys
whose clients opt for automatic with-
holding, these changes mean more re-
liance on and interaction with their state’s
IV-D or child-support agency.
C. New Enforcement Remedies
Another major effect of the federal-
ization of child support is the strength-
ening of interstate enforcement of child-
support orders in two major ways:
through license revocation and interstate
orders.
1. License Revocation
During the 1990s many states enact-
ed legislation authorizing licensing agen-
cies to withhold, suspend, or restrict the
use of driver’s, occupational, recreation-
al, or sporting licenses or all four as a
means to collect child support. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act requires states
to have and use such statutes as a sanc-
tion for failing to pay child support or,
after receiving appropriate notice, to com-
ply with subpoenas or warrants relating to
paternity or child-support proceedings. 1 l2
By 1998 all 50 states had enacted
license-revocation statutes. The legisla-
tive schemes for license restriction vary
considerably from state to state.l13  Al-
though the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
requires that states cover driver’s, occu-
pational, and recreational licenses, not all
“‘pub.  L. No. 104-193, 5 314, 110 Stat. 2105, 2212-14 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 8 666).
‘08Zd.  $ 3;5.
lOgThe  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act allows states to
opt for a decentralized computer-linked system if the system “will not cost more nor
take more time to establish and operate than a centralized system.” Id. $ 312, 110 Stat. at
2207-8 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 0 654b).  If states opt for a decentralized sys-
tem, they must still set up a single place for employers to send collected support.
110 r>
“‘zd.
“*Zd.  $ 325.
l13For  an excellent comparison of the features of most state license revocation statutes, see
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HFALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE LICENSE
RESTRKTIONS,  SUSPENSIONS, AND REVOCATIONS (Jan. 1998).  The Office of Child Support
Enforcement prepares “information exchanges” on a regular basis on a variety of child-
support topics. These exchanges provide state-by-state information identifying names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of contact people in IV-D agencies to assist in imple-
menting statutes to initiate or enforce child support. Practitioners can obtain such publi-
cations by calling or writing OCSE/Technical Assistance Branch, 4th Floor E., 370
L’Enfant  Promenade SW, Washington, DC 20447; 202.401.9267. Information can also be
obtained through the Web site www.acf.dhhs.gov/prograrns/cse.
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states are in comoliance.  Some states.
cover only driver’s licenses.114 Others are
limited to occupational licenses.“5 Still
others go beyond the sanctions mandat-
ed by the Act and permit restricting state
benefits such as student grants, govern-
ment contracts, car and other vehicle reg-
istration, and weapon permits.‘16
States have adopted criteria for re-
voking licenses for failure to pay child
support. Some states require a minimum
period of child-support delinquency be-
fore a license may be revoked, ranging
from one month to one year.“’ Other
statutes require different periods of arrear-
age depending upon the type of license
be ing  wi thhe ld ,  suspended ,  o r  re-
voked.*18 The most common arrearage
periods which trigger the license sanc-
tions range from 60 to 90 days.‘19
Some states require a court order of
contempt before an obligor may be sub-
ject to license revocation.120 Other states
limit license revocations based upon the
amount of the arrearage-ranging from
minimal amounts up to a maximum re-
quirement of $2,500.121  Still others have
criteria that trigger the license sanction
based upon either the amount or the
length of arrearages.122  Some statutes
make license revocation available only if
other enforcement remedies have been
exhausted or if income withholding is
unavailable.123
The procedural protections afforded
delinquent obligors also differ from state
to state in terms of both prerevocation
protections and postrevocation review.
All state statutes require some form of
prerevocation notice and hearing. A typ-
ical statute provides for notice through
certified mail informing obligors that they
are subject to revocation, the basis for
the revocation, and the steps that can be
taken to avoid suspension or loss of a
license.12*  Some statutes governing pre-
revocation review limit the basis for such
review to mistakes of fact, while others
178
‘14See  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 425.3837
(Michie 1996).
“5See  KAN. STAT. ANN. $§ 74-146, 74-147, 20-1204a (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
116$$  2301.373, 2301.374 (West 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3 4355 (West 1998).
See FLA. STAT. chs. 409.2598, 327.031 (vessel registration), 322.058 (vehicle registration)
(1999); IDAHO CODE 5 7-1401 2151(c) (1997) (weapon permits); MINN.  STAT. ANN.
Q 518.551 (West 1999) (student grants); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, $ 795 (1998) (government
contracts).
‘I’See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 5 11350.6(a)(4) (West 1999) (one month); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. 0 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (one year).
118
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, $5 795 (contracts, licenses: one-twelfth of annual support in
arrears), 798 (motor vehicle: one-fourth of annual support in arrears) (1998).
“9Statutes requiring 60 days’ arrearage include the following: COLO. REV.  STAT. $ 26-13-123
(1997); D.C. CODE ANN. 5 30-5251 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. $ 40-5-541 (1999); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW 5 lo-119  (1998); N.H. F&v. STAT. ANN. $ 161-B (1998); S.C. CODE ANN.
9 20-7-940 (Law. Co-op.  1998); UTAH CODE ANN. 80 62A-11-107,  78-32-17 (1998). Statutes
requiring 90 days’ arrearage include the following: CONN.  GEN. STAT. 0 46b-220 (1997); 5
GUAM CODE ANN. 05 34202-03 (1999);  IOWA CODE $ 252J.2 (1997); MINN. STAT. 0 518.551
(1999); NEB. m. STAT. 8 43-3314 (1998);  N.C. GF.N. STAT. $$ lT-142.2  (driver’s licenses),
142.1 (professional and business licenses) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08.1-06  (1998);
OKLA.  STAT. ANN. tit. 47, $ 6-201.1, tit. 43, 8 139.1 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS  $9 15-ll.l-
2, -7 (1998); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. $ 232.003 (West Supp. 2000); WYO.  STAT. ANN. $ 220-6-
111 (Michie 1999).
“‘See Aruz. Rw. STAT. 8 25-502 (1996);  KAN. STAT. ANN. 9 74-147 (1992);  MISS. CODE ANN.
I 93-11-157 (1998).
‘*lSee OR. REV. STAT. Q 25.750(1)(a) (1999) ($2,500); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, $ 528a (1995)
(minimal amount).
‘**See  COLO.  REV.  STAT. 85 26-13-123, -126, 42-2-127.5 (1997); MO. REV. STAT. 0 454.1000-
1025 (1997).
123 See FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13016 (1998) (if other remedies have been exhausted); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. $8 2301.373, 3113.216 (Anderson 1998) (if other remedies have been exhaust-
ed); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. $ 4355 (West 1998) (if income withholding is unavailable).
“*See KY. Rm. STAT. ANN. 8 186.570 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN, 0 2A:17-56.41
(west 1998).
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allow obligors to defend, based upon an
inability to pay, against such sanctions.l*5
Postrevocation review is available in most
states through an administrative proce-
dure, judicial hearings, or some combi-
nation of the t~0.l~~
Because of the variation in state law,
practitioners should consult their state
statutes both for procedures and criteria
for invoking license revocations and for
defenses and hearing opportunities avail-
able to obligors. Most states’ child-support
statutes have a general provision relating
to license limitations to enforce child-sup-
port orders. Because driver’s, occupation-
al, and other licenses are regulated under
different statutes and regulations, each
with its own set of licensing provisions,
practitioners should also consult each state
law governing the activity covered by the
license. These license-revocation statutes
are especially useful for practitioners seek-
ing to enforce child-support  orders in
which obligors are nonwage  earners, par-
ticularly self-employed professionals. On
the other hand, practitioners seeking to
protect obligors against such revocations
should be aware of  const i tut ional  and
other potential challenges to such statutes.
Equal  protect ion arguments  have
been used to challenge driver’s license
revocation statutes. The theory behind
these arguments is that such statutes cre-
ate a legislative classification between
child-support obligors who have driver’s
licenses and those who do not, thus sub-
jecting obligor drivers to harsher penal-
ties when they fail to pay child support.
Because such a classification need only
meet the rational relationship test and the
Supreme Court has found child-support
enforcement an important state interest,
such challenges have not been success-
ful. 12’ Professional license revocation
programs are also l ikely to withstand
equal  protect ion chal lenges under  the
same analysis.128
License-revocation statutes that apply
to all licensed occupations except attor-
neys have also been challenged in the
courts .  Attorneys were excluded from
these statutes because regulation of attor-
neys, unlike other professionals, in many
states is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state’s highest court rather than the
legislature. Some courts have responded to
challenges that excluding attorneys ren-
ders the statute arbitrary by amending the
court’s disciplinary rules to include license-
revocation provisions for attorneys.129
The most  promising chal lenges to
such state statutes may be due process
‘25See  23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 9 4355 (West 1998) (review for mistakes of fact); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 8, 0 528a  (1995) (review for mistakes of fact); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 0 798 (1998)
(inability to pay may be a defense).
l26See  ALASKA STAT. Q 25.27.246 (Michie 1998) (combination); ARIZ.  REV. STAT. ANN. $ 25-518
(West 1998) (judicial hearing); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP.  I 5 16-203 (1995) (administrative
procedure); MINN. STAT. ANN. 9 518.551 (West 1999) (combination); MISS. CODE ANN.
0 93-11-157 (1998) (combination); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, $ 139.1 (West 1998) (judicial
hearing).
‘27Zablocki  v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Clearinghouse No. 15,279) (child-support
enforcement found to be important state interest). Some unsuccessful challenges include
the following: Rushmore v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596  N.E.2d  340 (Mass. 1992)
(applying the “rational basis” standard and emphasizing that a suspension statute having
a disproportionate impact on drug offenders who operate motor vehicles does not
offend equal protection); State v. Smith, 276 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (stating that the equal
protection clause does not require that the legislature punish all violators of narcotics
laws in the same way or not at all and that the legislature has wide discretion in recog-
nizing different classes of offenders for separate treatment>. See generally Jeffrey T.
Walter, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute or Regulation Authorizing
Revocation or Suspension of Driver’s License for Reason Unrelated to Use 01 or Ability to
Operate, a Motor Vehicle, 18 A.L.R.Sth 542 (1994).
128 Mark R. Fondacaro & Dennis P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle and Professional Licenses
for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement: Constttutional  Challenges and Policy
Implications, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  355, 389 (1996).
‘29See,  e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 0 4-8.4 (West 1994); see also Rhonda M. Hand & R. Wade
Wetherington, Chasing the Deadbeat Professional for Child Support, 69 FLA. B.J. 54 (Nov.
1995); IND. ADMISSION & DISCIPLINE R. 23, $0 11(c),  18(c).
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challenges based upon the availability or
scope or both availability and scope of
administrative and judicial review in the
state statute. While the argument may be
made that an obligor is entitled to a judi-
cial determination before revocation, a
predeprivation administrative hearing that
allows the obligor a “meaningful” oppor-
tunity to be heard should be sufficient.130
A constitutional challenge may be suc-
cessful, however, if the statute does not
permit judicial (as opposed to adminis-
trative) review at the postrevocation
stage. 131  Moreover, at least one court has
held that the scope of the judicial review
must permit the obligor the opportunity
to seek relief based on his inability to pay
the child support owed.‘3*
2. Interstate Orders
Finding a growing number of cases
involving disputes between parents resid-
ing in different states, and even an incen-
tive of sorts for noncustodial parents to
relocate solely to avoid a state court’s
jurisdiction, Congress enacted the Full
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders
Act in 1994.133  The “Full-Faith Amend-
ments” of the Act amended the Child
Support Recovery Act to help facilitate
interstate enforcement and to avoid “juris-
dictional competition among different
state courts.“134
In order to trigger full faith and cred-
it under the Full-Faith Amendments, the
court issuing the child-support order must
have had appropriate subject-matter juris-
diction and personal jurisdiction over all
parties and must have satisfied due
process guarantees of notice and hear-
ing for all parties. l3S A court that follows
these procedures retains “continuing
exclusive jurisdiction” as long as the child,
or any contestant, resides in that state.‘s6
The court of another state may modify
an order issued by a different state only
if the subsequent court has appropriate
jurisdiction and the issuing court no
longer maintains exclusive jurisdiction
because either the child no longer resides
there, or each party has filed written con-
sent to change venue.‘3’  In enacting the
Full-Faith Amendments, Congress also
sought to help custodial parents collect
on child-support orders when noncusto-
dial parents leave the state.138  As a result,
a noncustodial parent who wants to file
for a reduction in support payments must
file in the state that originally issued the
order; this ensures that the custodial par-
ent receives proper notice and a reason-
able opportunity to object139
The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act sets
up a national system to track the place of
employment of child-support obligors.140
New-hire information is also sent to a
national directory of new hires, which
runs a computer match against a federal
case registry of child-support orders to
determine if delinquent parents have
gone to work in other states. As a result,
if an obligor parent leaves a state and
goes to work anywhere in the country,
that state’s child-support agency should
know in a very short time. Under the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,
that child-support agency may then send
130 See Walters v. National Ass’n  of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985); Fondacaro
& Stolle, supra note 129.
131See  Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.S.D.  1995).
132Alaska  Dep’t of Revenue v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1998).
133Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063
av41.
13*8 1738B, 108 Stat. at 4064 28 U.S.C. 0(amending 1738B); see also S. REP. No. 103-361, at
4 (19941,.9r rqv-inted  in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3260.3259,
"'28 U.S.C. 8 1738B(c).
136Zd. 0 1738B(d).
13’Zd. 0 1738B(e).
‘38See  Pub. L. No.
‘39See S. REP. No.
103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 (1994).
103-361, at 5'*'42 U S.C. (19941,  inreprinted 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259, 3261.
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a wage withholding order directly across
state lines to the delinquent parent’s
employer.‘*l
Although a number of states had
new-hire reporting statutes before pas-
sage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
under the Act all states were required to
have programs conforming to the feder-
al requirements by October 1, 1998.
Practitioners can assist clients seeking to
initiate or enforce child-support orders
by contacting their new-hire state con-
tacts for information on implementing
these procedures in individual cases.***
D. New Federal Criminal Remedies
for Enforcement
Practitioners attempting to collect
arrearages from an out-of-state obligor
should advise their clients that they have
two important options: to file an action
under the state’s Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act or to seek
criminal prosecution under the Child
Support Recovery Act.143
When it enacted the Child Support
Recovery Act, Congress was primarily
concerned with noncustodial parents
who move to another state to avoid pay-
ing child support. As a result, the Act calls
for federal criminal prosecution of any
noncustodial parent who willfully fails to
pay a past-due support obligation for a
child who resides in another state. The
crime established in the Act has been sub-
ject to constitutional challenge in many
courts but has been consistently upheld
as a valid exercise of congressional com-
merce power. l4 Practitioners who want
to use the Act to encourage payment of
arrearages should refer their clients to
their local U.S. Attorney’s office. While
most of these offices are just beginning to
bring prosecutions under the Act, some
larger jurisdictions have established units
specifically to bring these cases.
The past 25 years have seen increas-
ing federalization of child-support admin-
istration and enforcement. Although
many states’ IV-D agencies continue to
establish and collect child support, prac-
titioners in all states should become famil-
iar with federal laws in this area. Only
by understanding the federal programs
and requirements that affect state man-
agement of child-support programs will
family law practitioners be able optimal-
ly to represent and serve their clients.
:l:SeeUNIP.  INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr $ 501, 9 U.L.A. 410 (Supp. 1999).
For a list of new-hire state contacts, see Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t
o f  H e a l t h  & H u m a n  S e r v s . , New Hire Reporting (last updated Jan. 1999)
<www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/newhire/nh/nh.htm>  (select “How to Contact the
States”).
143 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 98 U.L.A. 567 (1987); Child Support
Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. $ 228 (West Supp. 19%).
144See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1232  (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Black, 125 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 479-80
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Simms, 936 F. Supp. 817, 818 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United
States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Ran.  1995).
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